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International rivalry in the Cold War has dominated scholarship on the post-
independence war in Angola, but little research has been done on how foreign 
support for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) had an impact on 
political mobilisation inside Angola. This article draws upon interviews with people 
who remembered the conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s in the Angolan Central 
Highlands, the area in which UNITA made its strongest identity-based claims against 
the MPLA state, and which was fiercely contested during the war. It compares these 
with memoirs and other secondary material that record elite perspectives on the war. 
I argue that ideologies espoused by the external players in Angola had little direct 
impact on the political affiliations of people in the contested area. Nevertheless, 
external support for rival movements in Angola indirectly shaped and polarised 
popular attitudes towards the movements, notably by providing the MPLA and UNITA 
with the capacity to present themselves as state-like. 
 
Much of the history of Angola from independence in 1975 until the end of the Cold 
War has been written as a narrative of foreign intervention. If ideology is mentioned 
in relation to the war, this usually refers to the global ideologies of the Cold War, 
alongside an assumption that the ideologies of the MPLA and UNITA were congruent 
with those of their foreign allies. The relationship between these global ideologies and 
popular mobilisation has been neglected.1 The purpose of this article, therefore, is to 
consider the relationship between Angolan and global politics from a different 
perspective, by examining the impact of Cold War alliances on the thinking of 
Angolan elites and on processes of political mobilisation and political identity 
formation in Angola.  
Through the 1980s and 1990s, a large part of the writing by foreign journalists 
and scholars on the Angolan conflict and its international connections was driven by 
opposition to apartheid in South Africa.2 This literature assumes popular support for 
the MPLA, views UNITA as being driven not by internal Angolan concerns but by its 
duties as a South African and US proxy, and ignores UNITA’s engagement with 
civilian society in the parts of Angola that it controlled. Other writers, who were 
ideologically opposed to communism, celebrated UNITA and took for granted its 
                                                
1 The same is true for the literature on the wider southern African region during the Cold War, with the 
notable exception of work that examines the the impact of the Cold War international context on the 
internal ideologies of settler state regimes. See D. Lowry, ‘The Impact of Anti-Communism on White 
Rhodesian Political Culture, ca. 1920s –1980’, Cold War History, 7, 2 (2007), pp. 169–94; J. Miller, 
‘Things Fall Apart: South Africa and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire, 1973–74’, Cold War 
History, 12, 2 (2012), pp. 183–204.  
2 Two journalistic accounts are V. Brittain, Death of Dignity: Angola’s Civil War (London, Pluto 
Press, 1998) and M. Wolfers and J. Bergerol, Angola in the Front Line (London, Zed Books, 1983). 
Scholarly treatments include W. Minter, Apartheid’s Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in 
Angola and Mozambique (London, Zed Books, 1994) and G. Wright, The Destruction of a Nation: 
United States’ Policy Toward Angola Since 1945 (London, Pluto Press, 1997).  
legitimacy as a representative of an Angolan nation.3 Both groups of writers’ concern 
with international interests leaves scant space to consider political strategy within 
Angola.4 
Since the 1990s, our understandings of the motivations for and consequences 
of American, Soviet, Cuban and South African involvement in Angola and in other 
conflicts have been enriched by the flowering of historical research on the Cold War, 
made possible by newly accessible archives. A common thread in this literature 
concerns the ideological motivations of the intervening powers. For Westad, the US 
and the Soviet Union were driven respectively by an ideology of individual freedom 
that evolved into an imperative ‘to make the world safe for capitalism’,5 and by a 
version of socialist ideology in which ‘the competition for influence in the Third 
World was an essential part of the existence of socialism’.6 Gleijeses emphasises 
Cuba’s autonomy from the Soviet Union’s agendas, and sees Cuban interventions in 
Africa as motivated above all by a vision of a ‘world that was dominated … by the 
conflict between privileged and underprivileged, humanity against imperialism’ and 
where the major fault line was ‘not between socialist and capitalist states but between 
developed and undeveloped countries’.7 Central to such analysis is the fact that 
decolonisation coincided temporally with the Cold War. If modernity is about the 
extension of the reach of states and the efforts by states to shape societies, the space 
for ideological influence by the Cold War powers was to be found in the projects of 
state-building and nation-building that accompanied decolonisation. As Westad notes, 
‘the revolutions that followed were often inspired by either the Soviet or American 
form of high modernism’.8 However, this wave of literature is little concerned with 
the internal politics of Angola and other countries that were sites of foreign 
intervention.  
While questions of local ideology and popular participation in Cold War-era 
African conflicts are barely present in the literature on global history, such questions 
dominate a separate body of scholarship that takes a national or sub-national 
perspective. Histories of the Zimbabwean war of independence and the Mozambican 
post-independence war, for example, rely on interview as well as documentary 
sources and have addressed questions about the nature of and motivations for 
participation in those conflicts.9 More recent scholarship has started to investigate the 
                                                
3 The pre-eminent journalist account is F. Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa (Edinburgh, 
Mainstream, 1986), though an earlier example is F. Sitte, Flammenherd Angola (Vienna, Kremayr und 
Scheriau, 1972).  
4 Shafer’s comment on literature about the Mozambican guerrilla movement, Renamo, is pertinent also 
to Angola and UNITA: ‘scholars analyzing Renamo’s success at anchoring itself in the countryside 
initially attempted to find explanations which denied the role of civilian support, because of their over-
riding belief that Renamo was not ideologically motivated, but rather a puppet of the apartheid regime’, 
J. Shafer, ‘Guerrillas and Violence in the War in Mozambique: De-Socialization or Re-Socialization?’, 
African Affairs, 100, 399 (2001), p. 216. A rare exception is the work of Heywood, who examines the 
longer historical roots of UNITA’s social relations in Angola: L. Heywood, ‘UNITA and Ethnic 
Nationalism in Angola’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 27, 1 (1989) pp. 47–66; L. Heywood, 
‘Towards an Understanding of Modern Political Ideology in Africa: The Case of the Ovimbundu of 
Angola’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 36, 1 (1998) pp. 139–67; L. Heywood, Contested Power 
in Angola: 1840s to the Present (Rochester, University of Rochester Press, 2002). 
5 O. Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 31.  
6 Ibid., p. 72. 
7 P. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington and Africa 1959–1976 (Chapel Hill and 
London, University of North Carolina Press, 2002), p. 377. 
8 Westad, The Global Cold War, p. 397. 
9 On Zimbabwe, see T. Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe: A 
Comparative Study (London, James Currey, 1985); N. Kriger, Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant 
‘transnational and non-national’ nature of armed conflict in southern Africa, which 
had previously been studied within the epistemological frames of ‘national 
liberation’.10 Beyond southern Africa, conflict studies developed as a cross-
disciplinary sub-field of study during the 1990s. While some strands within this 
literature concentrate on resource predation or on state weakness, most pertinent to 
my perspective here is that part of the literature on conflict that brings ideology back 
into the analysis: ideology not in the sense of the global ideologies of the Cold War, 
but in the sense of the structured understandings that endow actions with meaning. If 
the task of ‘political entrepreneurs’, to use Tilly’s term, is ‘the activation and 
reinforcement of boundaries’, the creation and consolidation of perceptions of ‘we’ 
and ‘them’,11 then ideological appeals are one part of this process. Such appeals, 
imbricated with ideas and narratives about the past and the present that frame 
understandings about the relationship between the individual and the political 
movement, may be manipulated by political actors in order to shape perceptions of 
solidarity and enmity. In Broch-Due’s words, ‘[i]ndividuals and groups call on 
cultural and historical narratives, arguments and ideologies, to challenge established 
parameters and reinforce their claims to legitimacy’.12 However, close-up studies of 
political mobilisation in wartime are rare in the case of Angola.13 What is more, in 
scholarship on southern Africa more broadly, there has been no dialogue between the 
burgeoning literature on global history and the literature that deals with conflict in 
relation to mobilisation around national and sub-national identities.  
In this article, I bridge that gap by investigating the impact of the Cold War 
upon local politics in Angola during the civil war. I consider how and to what extent 
the rivalry between the superpowers, and the fact of Cuban or South African support 
for the rival Angolan movements, influenced the politicising efforts of the MPLA and 
of UNITA, and how people responded to them. My primary concern here is with how 
the elites associated with the rival political movements sought to shape perceptions of 
popular interest to political ends, and how people perceived and expressed their own 
relationship with the MPLA and UNITA. This is not to say that political identities 
were uniformly strong, nor that they remained fixed throughout the civil war. The 
strongest self-identification with a political movement is, naturally, expressed by 
elites on one or other side, and by people who spent the entire war in territory 
                                                                                                                                       
Voices (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992); J. Alexander, J. McGregor and T. Ranger, 
Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the ‘Dark Forests’ of Matabeleland (Oxford, James 
Currey, 2000). On Mozambique, see A. Nilsson, ‘From Pseudo-Terrorists to Pseudo-Guerillas: The 
MNR in Mozambique’, Review of African Political Economy, 20, 57 (1993) pp. 60–71; C. Geffray, La 
Cause des Armes au Mozambique: Anthropologie d’une Guerre Civile (Paris, Karthala, 1990); R. 
Gersony, Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in 
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Mozambican National Resistance Movement (RENAMO): A Study in the Destruction of an African 
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Mozambique (London, James Currey, 1991).  
10 L. White and M. Larmer, ‘Introduction: Mobile Soldiers and the Un-National Liberation of 
Southern Africa’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 40, 6 (2014) pp. 1271–4. 
11 C. Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 75. 
12 V. Broch-Due, ‘Violence and Belonging: Analytical Reflections’, in V. Broch-Due (ed.), Violence 
and Belonging: The Quest for Identity in Post-Colonial Africa (London, Routledge, 2005), p. 10. 
13 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, p. 235, and Minter, Apartheid’s Contras, p. 271, point out how little 
is known about the politics of mobilisation in Angola, owing to practical difficulties in research.  
controlled by only one political movement. But many Angolans experienced the 
control of the MPLA and of UNITA at different times in the war. They had no choice 
but to profess loyalty to whichever movement was in charge at that moment.14 It is for 
this reason that I use the word ‘adherent’ rather than ‘supporter’ of a political 
movement, since ‘support’ suggests too great a degree of voluntary affiliation.15 
Within these processes of politicisation, I find that the Cold War had consequences 
for local Angolan politics in ways that were related only tangentially to the 
ideological positions of the movements’ international allies. 
In contrast to many studies of civil war the principal burden of which is to 
explain the emergence of the rebel movement, I focus simultaneously on the MPLA 
and UNITA.16 This approach reflects the fact that UNITA did not rise up in rebellion 
against the MPLA. Rather, both movements started out in opposition to Portuguese 
colonial rule. Following the precipitate departure of the Portuguese and the defeat of 
the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) in 1975, the MPLA and 
UNITA each found itself in control of a part of the Angolan territory and population. 
Each used this physical control as the basis for making its rule hegemonic. The 
process of consolidating hegemony was two-sided: each movement sought to present 
itself as worthy of support, and at the same time to create perceptions of enmity 
towards the other movement by presenting it as opposed to the common good.  
Elsewhere I have argued that ideas about state building were at the core of the 
ideologies propagated by the MPLA and UNITA as they sought to legitimise their 
rule, and were internalised to a greater or lesser extent by the people who lived in the 
areas controlled by those two rival movements.17 UNITA, as well as the MPLA, was 
aware of the importance of portraying itself in a state-like manner. I draw upon Philip 
Abrams’s argument that ‘the idea of the state’ may be of more significance than the 
state itself and that the state ‘is first and foremost an exercise in legitimation’, and on 
the argument of Hansen and Stepputat that ‘languages of stateness’ may be politically 
persuasive.18 Hence to the belligerents in civil war, stateness is more than simply the 
goal of or aspiration to statehood: it is a tool for the legitimation of political authority 
by the government and its opponents alike, within the territory controlled by each. 
Ideas of stateness are a central part of the ideologies that defined the relationship 
between people and political entities, whether that entity be a recognised state, such as 
the state led by the MPLA, or an organisation that makes state-like claims, such as 
UNITA. These include the organisation’s responsibilities in providing for the welfare 
of the nation, its role as defender of the nation and its prerogatives of violence in 
fulfilling this role. People who lived under either or both movements during the 
course of their lives evoked ideas about stateness, whether explicitly or implicitly, in 
                                                
14 This observation about the relationship between military control and political identity echoes the 
findings of S. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2006). These issues as they pertain to Angola are discussed more fully in J. Pearce, ‘Control, Politics 
and Identity in the Angolan Civil War’, African Affairs, 111, 444 (2012) pp. 442–65. 
15 In Portuguese, the term ‘aderência’ (literally, adherence) is used to describe the following of a 
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governo /povo do MPLA’ (‘UNITA people’ or ‘government/MPLA people’). 
16 On the tendency to ‘criminalise’ the rebel movement, see R. Marchal and C. Messiant, ‘Une Lecture 
Symptomale de Quelques Théorisations Récentes des Guerres Civiles’, Revue Lusotopie, 13, 2 (2006), 
pp. 3–46. 
17 Pearce, ‘Control, Politics and Identity’. 
18 P. Abrams, ‘Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977)’, Journal of Historical Sociology 
1, 1 (1988), pp. 58–98; Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, States of Imagination: Ethnographic 
Explorations of the Postcolonial State (Durham, Duke University Press, 2001). 
their accounts of the politics of the war and of their identification with either or both 
political movements. I argue therefore that it is in and through ideologies of stateness, 
more than through the official ideologies of the Cold War, that the foreign presence in 
Angola in support of the MPLA and of UNITA made an impact on local political 
relationships during the civil war. Foreign support was important in that it provided 
the material conditions for the rival Angolan parties to consolidate their legitimacy by 
making a reality of stateness.  
The next two sections will consider ways in which the MPLA’s links with 
Cuba and UNITA’s various foreign connections were represented in the official 
discourse of each party, and in interviews with people in the Angolan Central 
Highlands on the subject of the war years. The interviewees include people of varying 
class positions and levels of education, people from the city of Huambo and farmers 
from rural villages, and people who had spent all or part of the war years under the 
control of UNITA, as well as people who had spent their entire lives in government-
controlled areas. I consider how these factors shaped the way in which people 
perceived and spoke of the Cuban and South African presence, and the roles of the 
Angolan political movements and their foreign allies. My use of sources in the two 
sections is not symmetrical: the section on Cuba and the MPLA relies more heavily 
on interviews, while the section on UNITA’s alliances makes greater use of elite 
writings. This reflects a different emphasis in the two sections. For the MPLA, its 
relationship with Cuba caused no anxiety for the elite, but the presence of Cubans in 
Angola elicited differing reactions from ordinary people. On the UNITA side, the elite 
was ambivalent about its former links with China and anxious over the political 
consequences of its relationship with South Africa, while for most Angolans in 
UNITA-held areas, the Chinese were absent and the South Africans barely present.  
Cuba and the MPLA 
The MPLA’s relationship with Cuba originated in informal contacts in the late 1950s 
at the Casa dos Estudantes do Império, the residence in Lisbon for students from the 
Portuguese empire, which became a centre of left-wing opposition to the Salazar 
regime.19 Cuba saw internationalism as an extension of its own revolution and its 
opposition to US ambitions.20 As Cuba established missions in ‘radical’ African 
capitals such as Algiers, Dar es Salaam and Brazzaville during the 1960s, there was 
occasional contact between Cuban and MPLA officials in those cities. The MPLA 
first sought the help of Cuban military instructors in 1965. The MPLA ideologue 
Lúcio Lara said that the MPLA ‘wanted Cuban instructors because of the prestige of 
the Cuban revolution and because their theory of guerrilla warfare was very close to 
our own’.21 Cuban support enabled MPLA guerrillas to infiltrate Cabinda and the 
Dembos region, north of Luanda, between 1965 and 1967, though the ultimate failure 
of these operations caused the relationship to cool.22 Nevertheless, it was to Cuba that 
the MPLA turned in 1975 as a South African invasion in support of UNITA, and the 
Zaire-based FNLA forces, threatened to oust the party after its declaration of 
independence in Luanda. The Cuban military intervention in November safeguarded 
the MPLA’s hold on Luanda by destroying the FNLA army, and by halting the South 
African invasion force. While Cuban troops continued to provide security in the years 
                                                
19 E. George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale 
(London, Frank Cass, 2005), p. 22. 
20 George, The Cuban Intervention, p. 14. 
21 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, p. 83. 
22 Ibid., pp. 174–82, 244. 
that followed, Cuban teachers and medical staff constituted the backbone of Angolan 
state service provision.23  
Histories of the relationship between the MPLA and Cuba have been written 
largely from Cuban sources, and concentrate on Cuban perceptions of the 
relationship. An exception is Mabeko-Tali’s account, which notes that the MPLA 
justified the Cuban intervention in terms of a sovereign state’s right under the UN 
Charter to seek military assistance against foreign aggression. But the MPLA also 
used ‘another justification, simultaneously emotional and ideological, more so than 
historical: Cuban fighters returned to Angola in the quality of the descendants of 
African slaves’. The MPLA’s justification for Cuban assistance rested ‘on the theme 
of the struggle against imperialism’, summed up in a phrase coined by Fidel Castro 
and repeated by officials of both countries: ‘what counts is not geography but 
ideology’.24 Angolan officials would speak of the two states as partners in a way that 
partly obscures the one-way flow of assistance. The Angolan President, José Eduardo 
dos Santos, on receiving the José Martí medal in Havana in 1980, spoke of ‘our 
friendship, consolidated in the trenches, reinforced in the battle for national 
reconstruction, shoulder to shoulder’ and ‘relations with the Republic of Cuba and 
with other countries of the socialist community, our policy of co-operating with all the 
countries of the world that respect the principle of non-interference’.25 
Yet the alliance was less consistent than the rhetoric. Gleijeses suggests that 
Agostinho Neto, Angolan president from 1975 until his death in 1979, wished to 
reduce dependence on Cuba in order to cultivate a better relationship with the west, 
but also relied on Cuba to fend off South African aggression.26 By 1981, Lúcio Lara 
was lamenting the decline of a once ‘brotherly’ relationship and calling for it to be 
restored in the face of renewed US and South African threats.27 Cuba indeed retained 
its role as the MPLA’s security guarantor through the 1980s. Dos Santos, in his 
speeches and interviews, continued to insist that the South African invasion had been 
defeated ‘thanks to the militant participation of internationalists like the fighting 
comrades of Cuba’28 and that ‘Cuban co-operation was always very important to our 
country, and in various sectors’, including education, health, civil construction and 
agriculture.29 Notwithstanding the occasional mismatch between rhetoric and reality, 
the MPLA’s discourses at home and on the international stage were mutually 
consistent. Unlike the UNITA elite, which, as we shall see, was ever anxious about its 
unsavoury relationship with apartheid South Africa, MPLA leaders comfortably 
shared with their Cuban counterparts a language of internationalism and third world 
solidarity. 
For people in the Central Highlands, their first contact with Cubans was when 
Cuban forces alongside the MPLA’s People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of 
Angola (FAPLA) occupied the region’s main towns in February 1976. Their arrival 
                                                
23 ‘Between November 1975 and 1976, 36,000 Cuban soldiers poured into Angola.… Their number 
peaked at 55,000 in 1988’; by 1978, there were nearly 7,000 Cuban aid workers in Angola, including 
teachers, construction workers and health staff. Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom, pp. 9, 84. 
24 J-M. Mabeko-Tali, Dissidências e Poder de Estado: O MPLA Perante Si Próprio (1962–1977) Vol. 
2: 1974–1977 (Luanda, Nzila, 2001), pp. 132–3. Mabeko-Tali’s account benefits from unique access to 
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my own. 
25 J.E. dos Santos, A Luta do Povo pela Unidade e pelo Socialismo (Lisbon, Avante, 1985), p. 26. 
26 Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom, p. 103. 
27 Ibid., p. 194. 
28 Dos Santos, A Luta, p. 30.  
29 Ibid., p. 168. 
was facilitated by the retreat of South African troops, who had been providing back-
up to UNITA.30 Military assistance to the MPLA was followed by the arrival of 
Cuban professionals, whose expertise was crucial to the MPLA’s efforts to build state 
institutions.31 The remainder of this section considers the ways in which the Cuban 
presence was remembered and recounted by the people whom I interviewed, taking 
into account both the political convictions of the interviewee, and the circumstances 
in which the interviewee encountered the Cubans.  
Among the most ideologically committed interviewees, attitudes to the Cubans 
ran concurrent with broader political loyalties. Such interviewees parroted the party 
line of one side or the other: they serve as a reference point by which to understand 
the more nuanced or ambivalent views expressed in other interviews. One interviewee 
was a soba (chief), appointed to a position in a peri-urban bairro of Huambo.32 Pro-
MPLA politicisation appeared to have been particularly strong here, as the bairro had 
been a resettlement area for people displaced during government counter-insurgency 
operations, and this had an impact on how people recounted their history in the post-
war period in which I was researching. The soba spoke of having been ‘captured’ to 
serve in the MPLA’s armed forces while employed as a contract labourer in northern 
Angola in the 1960s. This ‘capture’ had nevertheless cemented his identification with 
the MPLA, and he habitually dressed in the party colours: ‘the MPLA called the 
Cubans to join our armed struggle. We were friends, great friends. No one spoke ill of 
the Cubans. To this day, the Cubans are great friends’.33  
The fact that memories of the Cubans were still politically loaded in that 
village became evident during an interview with another man in the same location. 
This interviewee, who had been conscripted to fight for the MPLA in the late 1970s, 
complained that the Cubans ‘just stole things from the people, ate our food. In battle 
they stayed behind and the Angolans were pushed to the front’.34 This version of 
events provoked a reaction from bystanders eavesdropping on the interview, who 
interrupted the interviewee, insisting that ‘the Cubans were our brothers’.  
More educated interviewees spoke of the Cuban involvement in a way that 
reflected the party discourse, as in the case of a civil servant who had spent his life in 
the service of the MPLA: ‘the Cubans at that time were taking part in the proletarian 
struggle, to win against colonialism and especially capitalism. They were always 
people well disposed to helping those who were in difficult situations. We felt this: in 
war, at school, in the hospitals they were with us’.35  
To move from one set of extreme views to the opposite, some of the strongest 
anti-Cuban sentiments were expressed by people who had been with UNITA in 
wartime, and who remained part of the networks of former UNITA combatants after 
the war, which provided a space to recount narratives of the war contrary to the 
MPLA version. These people were adamant that Cuba had invaded Angola, and for 
this reason they had joined UNITA to defend the Angolan nation. This view was 
repeated so consistently that it was clear that it had been a theme in UNITA’s political 
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31 D. Birmingham, ‘Angola’, in P. Chabal (ed.), A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa (London, 
Hurst, 2002), p. 150. 
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33 Interview with a village chief, Huambo, May 2008. All interviews for this article were conducted by 
the author. 
34 Interview, farmer, Huambo, May 2008. 
35 Interview, civil servant, Huambo, June 2008. 
education. The Cuban presence was useful to UNITA in bolstering its nationalist 
claims by casting the enemy as the agent of foreign forces.36  
One woman I interviewed had been a young adult working in Huambo at the 
time of independence. She recalled running away from Huambo as the Cubans 
advanced in February 1976: ‘when the MPLA entered Huambo with the Cuban forces 
we thought they were coming to persecute the UNITA people. Many were killed. We 
went back [to the city] when it was returning to normal’.37 ‘Normal’, however, proved 
to be relative. ‘The Cubans would take people’s animals. The people lived with 
oppression. This is why many people preferred UNITA and made the revolution 
underground. The Cubans and Angolans [MPLA] co-operated in oppression. The 
Cubans raped women – anyone who said no to them would be punished. After 
returning to Huambo she continued to work underground for UNITA in the city, 
arranging for supplies to be delivered to guerrillas in the bush and for information and 
propaganda from UNITA to be circulated in the city. Later she left Huambo to re-join 
UNITA in the countryside, where she worked in UNITA’s health services.  
The examples noted so far illustrate the two poles of opinion about the Cuban 
presence in Angola. The speakers were people who, through their work as activists or 
as cadres attached to the MPLA or to UNITA, had come to accept unquestioningly the 
preferred discourse of one or the other party about historical events and about the 
relationship of the two parties to Angolan society. For many other interviewees, 
however, their perception of the Cubans and of the role they played was shaped not by 
politicisation within party structures but rather by the circumstances in which they 
encountered Cuban soldiers or cooperantes. The Cuban presence was far from 
uniform throughout Angola. The MPLA state comprised islands of control surrounded 
by countryside that was either controlled by UNITA or perpetually contested between 
the two armies. Even within this archipelago-like state, the Cubans clustered only in 
the urban centres of each ‘island’. It was in places like Huambo city, a centre of 
MPLA state-led development that was all but isolated amid countryside in which 
UNITA moved freely, that the Cubans made the greatest impact. The MPLA sought 
to win the support of the urban population through the provision of services, and the 
Cubans provided the technical expertise that made this role possible. In the words of a 
lawyer who had been a young man in the mid-1970s: 
 
When the MPLA appeared in 1976 it appeared with the Cubans – with a different type of 
organisation, a more supported organisation, to distinguish it from UNITA, which had a more 
backward society, of a lower level. […] This brought a bit more stability, which as time went 
on convinced people that things were moving in a positive direction.38  
 
As an educated man, this interviewee was able to articulate clearly what was implicit 
in many other interviews: that the MPLA built its legitimacy on its ability to construct 
a state and that the Cubans were central to the project of state building. Being a 
lawyer, he worked in a state system that was closely associated with the party, so it is 
not surprising that his ideological frame of reference corresponds to the official one, 
but his conclusions are also grounded in his experience of life in the city under MPLA 
control.  
                                                
36 Bridgland describes a piece of UNITA propaganda theatre in which Agostinho Neto strikes a 
bargain with Leonid Brezhnev and Fidel Castro, and Cuban soldiers slaughter Angolan peasants until 
being defeated by UNITA. Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, p. 313. 
37 Interview, farmer, Huambo, July 2008. 
38 Interview, lawyer, Huambo, May 2008. 
Some other urban interviewees were well disposed towards the Cubans despite 
not having close connections with the MPLA:  
 
the Cubans lived together well with the people. They left sons and daughters. Everyone knew 
they were foreigners, but there were no limits to how we could live together. They had a 
different status. They had their own separate shops, but you could also see Cubans shopping in 
the market.39  
 
This was due in part to a perception of Cubans as protectors. ‘Wherever the Cubans 
were, there was stability. UNITA didn’t attack there. The Cubans didn’t impose 
themselves ideologically on the population. They helped, helped a lot. They lived 
apart from us, but socially they were very friendly’.40 Not all of these interviewees 
explicitly attributed a political agenda to either the Cubans or the MPLA. 
Nevertheless, as urban people, from modest backgrounds but reasonably well 
educated, these people enjoyed some benefit from Cuban development or security 
provision.  
In those peri-urban villages that fell within the MPLA’s security zone, 
villagers were marginal to the ambitions of the state and the party. Some, like the 
soba quoted earlier, had come to accept the party’s views about its status as the 
defender of Angolan citizens against a common enemy. This had been the experience 
of another interviewee who had lived on the fringes of Huambo as a teenager in the 
1970s and as a young woman in the 1980s. When asked about the Cuban presence, 
she spoke first of the Cubans’ military role. ‘They were the army. Their programme 
was to fight against the enemy, which was UNITA. They went around the bush in 
their vehicles looking for the enemy – we remained in our bairros’.41 Only when 
asked whether there were also Cubans in civilian life did she reply: ‘they also worked. 
They helped in the hospital, curing the sick. In all the departments they helped a lot. 
Some were soldiers, others civil servants. They did their work of development here in 
the civil service’. Her acceptance of the Cubans, even if their presence had little direct 
impact on her life, contrasts with the views of people in more marginal peri-urban or 
rural areas, whose lives were untouched by the MPLA state-building project. 
Another of my interview sites was a village on the outskirts of the city of 
Huambo. Typical comments here were ‘everything that the Cubans found they killed 
or took by force’ or ‘everyone took cattle: the government and UNITA’.42 According 
to these interviewees, the Cubans had difficulty with the fact that all Angolans were 
the same colour, hence it was difficult for them to spot the enemy. The result of this 
was that the Cubans were suspicious towards all Angolans, particularly those whose 
language, Umbundu, marked them as being from the same ethnic group as Jonas 
Savimbi.  
Some of the men in this group had been conscripted into the FAPLA, but their 
experience of combat had only deepened their resentment of Cubans. ‘It was an 
international war. The MPLA with the Cubans, UNITA with the South Africans. But 
it was mostly Angolans who died. Only a few Cubans died. They pushed us to the 
front. They’d say “you are the master of this land”’. These were people who had 
never been exposed to UNITA’s politicisation. Yet although they had lived under 
MPLA control as soldiers or as civilians, the fact that they saw little benefit from the 
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MPLA’s state-building project gave them no reason to view the Cubans with anything 
other than suspicion.  
People’s attitudes towards the Cubans were determined by the circumstances 
in which they encountered them. But the flatly contradictory statements about the 
Cubans that emerged in interviews sometimes appeared to have been a matter of 
interpretation rather than a matter of fact. The Cubans mixed well with the Angolans 
despite living in separate quarters – or their privileged existence only bred alienation 
and resentment from Angolans. When Cuban soldiers fathered the children of 
Angolan women, this was interpreted by some as a sign of the Cubans’ integration 
into Angolan society and by others as evidence of their propensity to rape. Some 
believed that the fact that the Cubans spoke Spanish, a language related to Portuguese, 
helped them to integrate, while others insisted that the fact that they spoke neither 
Portuguese nor Umbundu kept them apart from Angolans.  
People who lived in the cities were more likely to have enjoyed the benefits 
that the Cubans brought in terms of welfare and development. Yet city people who 
had strong pro-UNITA convictions dating from before independence were more likely 
to regard the MPLA’s developmental efforts with suspicion, and see the Cubans as 
proof of the foreign nature of the MPLA. These two factors were mutually 
reinforcing: experience of the Cubans moulded people’s political views, while 
political convictions also coloured how interviewees interpreted the Cubans’ role.  
UNITA: From Beijing to Pretoria 
In 1976, Jonas Savimbi and some of his generals were on holiday in Namibia as the 
guests of the South African Defence Force. Samuel Chiwale, who would later become 
the commander of UNITA’s armed forces, recalls the visit in his memoir. 
 
It was there, in South West Africa, that we received the news of the death of Mao Tse-Tung, 
the president of China. 
‘We have lost a great friend and a great ally’, said Dr Savimbi. ‘But let us not be 
despondent and let us hope for whoever will replace him’.… 
We spent a few days swimming, and in between swimming and the well-earned rest 
that we could now enjoy, we discussed with General Malan, General Foliun [Viljoen] and 
Brigadier Skuman [Schoeman] the strategy to adopt to put down the red invasion.43  
 
Mourning Mao while consorting with apartheid generals provides a vivid illustration 
of the UNITA leadership’s opportunistic attitude to its foreign connections. UNITA’s 
links with China began soon after Savimbi’s break from the FNLA to found UNITA 
in 1966. Maoist ideas informed Savimbi’s strategy of mobilising rural communities 
during the anti-colonial war.44 In 1967, Mao had advised Savimbi to establish a rear 
base in the remote woodlands of eastern Angola, as well as establishing a ‘fish in 
water’ relationship with the peasants of the more densely populated Central 
Highlands.45 This dual strategy, learnt from Mao, addressed both the need to operate 
in an environment where the population was large enough to allow UNITA to recruit 
people to its cause – what Savimbi called ‘the theory of big numbers’ – and the need 
for a remote base that was safe from attack by the MPLA government.46  
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South Africa’s interest in Angola was heightened when the Portuguese coup of 
25 April 1974 raised the prospect of independence for Portugal’s African colonies, 
which had formed a security cordon for the apartheid state. As the three rival Angolan 
movements vied for position after the coup, fears about the MPLA’s leftward 
orientation prompted South Africa to intervene by providing limited military training 
to UNITA and the FNLA during 1974, before committing itself to UNITA in the 
second half of 1975. By August, the departure of Portuguese forces from Angola’s 
southern border prompted South Africa to take control of the extreme south of the 
country. In October, South Africa launched a full-scale invasion in an attempt to expel 
the MPLA from Luanda by the scheduled independence date of 11 November. This 
force was repelled by Cuban soldiers, who had arrived in response to a plea from the 
MPLA.  
UNITA, meanwhile, attempted to establish a government in Huambo, where it 
had seized control in mid 1975, though it barely managed to keep the remnants of the 
colonial state operating. When Angola officially became independent at midnight on 
10 November, Jonas Savimbi was in Pretoria, meeting South Africa’s Prime Minister, 
J.B. Vorster. According to a South African Defence Force account, Vorster said that 
South Africa would remain in Angola as long as it could keep the Cubans at bay.47 
The memoir of the UNITA official Jardo Muekalia reads this conditional pledge as 
providing an opt-out for South Africa were things to get tough. This was due in part to 
the lack of enthusiasm from the US to provide diplomatic cover for South Africa, and 
partly because Vorster preferred seeking détente to confrontation with South Africa’s 
neighbours.48 
By February, once South Africa had withdrawn to within 50 miles of the 
Angola–Namibia border, UNITA had no means of defending its position in the 
Central Highlands. A former associate of Savimbi recalls him saying: ‘we don’t know 
how to choose our friends. The United States is not our friend. If we’d chosen the 
Russians we’d be in Luanda by now’.49 As the Cuban and FAPLA soldiers 
approached from the coast, UNITA soldiers, officials and civilian adherents left the 
Central Highland cities that they had occupied and headed east to their redoubts from 
the anti-colonial war in Moxico province.  
There followed an episode that was to become mythologised in UNITA’s 
accounts of its own history as the Long March, as Savimbi and his followers headed 
westwards back to the Central Highlands, avoiding the towns where they were liable 
to run into Cuban soldiers. Mao continued to loom large in Savimbi’s political 
imagination. In Chiwale’s words: ‘[t]he tough journey to flee from the tentacles of our 
executioners came to be known in the history of our party as the Long March, because 
of the similarity to that of Mao Tse Tung and his companions’.50 The former associate 
of Savimbi quoted above took a more cynical view, describing the ‘Long March’ label 
as ‘a question of marketing’.51  
Even while the MPLA controlled the towns, UNITA’s officers found that they 
could mobilise people in the rural Central Highlands. It was during this period that the 
officers learnt of the death of Mao while on holiday in Namibia. After 1977, FAPLA 
and Cuban soldiers began to attack UNITA positions, but this did not prevent UNITA 
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from maintaining bases across rural Angola, where it was able to apply what Savimbi 
had learnt from Mao, by cultivating a consensual relationship with the rural 
population. In the Central Highlands, these bases were within UNITA’s ethno-
linguistic heartland, and within attacking distance of some economically important 
towns. UNITA’s strategy was to offer rudimentary education and health care, thus 
winning the trust of the people and inculcating a fear of the MPLA, against which 
UNITA could offer itself as a guarantor of security.  
The plan included political rallies ‘to mobilise the masses and their elites’.52 
Elite mobilisation included recruiting the pastors, teachers and health staff from the 
Protestant missions where the UNITA leaders had been educated, so that these 
professionals could apply their skills under the auspices of UNITA. General Nunda, 
who was sent by Savimbi to bring people from Dôndi mission, makes clear that they 
were tricked into travelling to UNITA-held zones, from which they would not be 
allowed to return: 
 
[Savimbi] didn’t say to me ‘you will fetch the leaders for them never to return’. I went to tell 
the leaders that Dr Savimbi was in an area not far away, just so you can go and meet him … 
and afterwards I will bring you back. When we arrived there [where Savimbi was] he told me, 
‘go and fetch their wives – you will find a way of bringing their families here’. Eventually I 
understood that I hadn’t fetched the pastors for them to return afterwards.53  
 
Professionals in UNITA’s ranks were necessary in order for UNITA to provide 
services as a way of cementing support: ‘the Chinese revolution taught that a guerrilla 
movement that wants to take power has to create support bases’, Nunda said. This 
contrasted with the role of the peasantry, which ‘was more the population where 
soldiers were recruited, the population that organised food for the troops, and also 
carried weapons for the troops’. UNITA officials would later use the same logic to 
justify the kidnapping of skilled people to work in its showcase capital, Jamba, in 
south-eastern Angola. As I discuss below, the existence of Jamba was central to 
UNITA’s articulation of an ideology that linked nationalist legitimacy to a 
programme of state building.  
Maoist influence on UNITA was confined to the practicalities of waging a 
guerrilla war rather than constituting a vision for a future Angola. According to Jaka 
Jamba: ‘as we were establishing the guerrilla struggle, theories that influenced us the 
most were those that came from the people who had been best at making this kind of 
war. Hence the passion for China …. It wasn’t about big doctrines’.54 Chiwale recalls 
Savimbi saying in 1977: 
 
[w]e are not going to reject certain theses of Marxism completely, particularly that which says 
power must be seized from the bourgeois class and handed over to the worker and peasant 
class.… If [for the MPLA] the revolution moves from urban centres to the periphery, our 
perspective is the opposite, that is, one has to move from the countryside to the city, since … 
we don’t have a working class in the real sense of the word.55 
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After 1978, Savimbi turned away from China, as he became increasingly reliant on 
South Africa for support.56 Nevertheless, it was precisely this South African backing 
that enabled UNITA in the early 1980s to implement a second phase of the strategy 
learned from Mao: that of the secure rear base in the form of Jamba, far from the 
Central Highlands but close to South African-occupied Namibia.  
Central to understanding UNITA’s relationship with South Africa is the fact 
that Angolans in UNITA-controlled areas had minimal contact with South Africans. 
This differed from the situation in government-controlled areas where Angolan 
citizens frequently encountered Cuban civilian or military personnel.  Hence, in 
contrast to the Cuban presence, which elicited a range of reactions, the lack of contact 
between Angolans and South Africans meant that Angolan perceptions of South 
Africans were determined by official prescriptions on both sides. 
Moreover, while MPLA officials professed an ideological affinity with the Cubans, 
the same was not true for UNITA officials with respect to the South Africans. At the 
time of independence, UNITA already knew of the political liability that was created 
by South African military support. When the news was confirmed in the international 
media, Muekalia describes the political consequences as follows: ‘[i]n that context it 
was, politically, a mortal sin to accept any help from the racist South African regime 
… the world’s reaction was more emotional than rational. It was no use arguing about 
superior Cuban and Soviet military personnel on the other side’.57 The MPLA and its 
sympathisers lost no opportunity to present UNITA’s connection with the apartheid 
regime as evidence of UNITA’s counter-revolutionary character. The revelation of its 
links with South Africa cost UNITA the sympathy of some European and most 
African states.58 As UNITA prepared for its Fourth Congress in 1977, it attempted 
some damage control by inviting the African American journalist Leon Dash, who 
had already spent several weeks with UNITA in 1973. In Muekalia’s account, 
‘[c]ountries and organisations that were trying to avoid confronting the complexity of 
the Angolan problem, hid behind this factor to justify simplifying it. For these 
reasons, the participation of an American journalist in this congress appeared to be of 
strategic importance’.59  
Still today, UNITA officials try to justify the alliance with South Africa as a 
relationship born of desperate circumstances. In his account of the early years of the 
war against the MPLA, Chiwale emphasises that Savimbi was vocally opposed to 
apartheid and defends UNITA’s decision to seek South African help as a matter of 
survival against a Cuban-supported MPLA.60 Chiwale claims that Savimbi used the 
opportunity of a meeting in 1978 with South African government ministers to call for 
Nelson Mandela’s release from prison.61 Muekalia was part of a delegation to 
London, an important centre of the anti-apartheid movement, in 1985. Savimbi 
warned Muekalia that the ‘very liberal’ British intelligentsia and media would 
challenge him on UNITA’s South African links.  
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It was important for us to confront the question of explaining that it had to do with a 
coincidence of interests in the framework of geopolitics and that history had various examples 
of alliances of this kind: Stalin’s alliance with Hitler, at the beginning of the Second World 
War, did not lead Stalin to adopt Nazism …. It was, above all, a question of survival.… 
UNITA’s priority was the struggle against the Russo-Cuban occupation of Angola.… Apart 
from that, apartheid is a state ideology with no possibility of expansion. Even if we wanted to 
adopt it, against whom would we apply it? 
 
These UNITA elite memoirs make it clear that the alliance with South Africa 
was a source of shame that rhetoric could not purge. Yet for people who had lived in 
UNITA areas and identified with the movement, there was no need to resolve the 
contradiction posed by UNITA’s association with a racist regime, since apartheid was 
barely known to them. Interviewees were surprised to learn that there had been a 
system called apartheid under which black people were oppressed by a white 
government. To understand the significance of South Africa in UNITA discourses, it 
is first necessary to consider how UNITA sought to establish its legitimacy in the eyes 
of the people who lived in the areas that it controlled, namely through visible state-
building. I will return to this point later.  
Yet even while UNITA’s association with South Africa and the US caused the 
outside world to see UNITA as a conservative movement, Muekalia’s account creates 
a contradictory picture. Muekalia insists that ‘UNITA was, and continues to be, a 
party ideologically of the left’, recalling debates within UNITA among Marxists and 
Maoists.62 Yet he also echoes Savimbi’s fears of Soviet expansion, a theme voiced 
first at the 1977 Fourth Congress.63 While, on the one hand, this resolution was 
strategic in terms of soliciting support from South Africa and the US, inside UNITA it 
was articulated in a manner that was consistent with the nationalist character that 
UNITA strove to present. Muekalia frames opposition to the MPLA in terms of longer 
histories: the MPLA sought Soviet and Cuban support because it lacked deep roots in 
Angolan society. The uneven penetration of colonial rule over Angola had led to the 
creation of a class of ‘acculturated’ blacks distinct from the ‘indigenous’ majority. 
This distinction, he argues, was perpetuated by an MPLA located within the 
assimilated class that was ‘incapable of seeing the others as fellow citizens’.64  
Savimbi, when he spoke to western audiences, would portray UNITA as a 
force for democracy, pointing out that the MPLA had avoided the multi-party 
elections that both parties had agreed to as part of the transition plan set out in the pre-
independence Alvor Accord. Savimbi would link this to narratives of African 
authenticity, and, while anti-communist, he did not hesitate to characterise UNITA as 
‘socialist’: ‘[t]he people want to taste freedom in peace. For that they need a 
democratic government, elected and representing the three liberation movements, 
MPLA, FNLA and UNITA. The building of African socialism cannot be the same as 
the Castro model. We have our past, our customs’.65 In a request for South African 
arms and other supplies in 1976, Savimbi played to Pretoria’s self-image as a bastion 
against communism, arguing that UNITA’s struggle ‘against the new domination of 
Soviet comunists [sic], must be considered as an advanced line in the defence of the 
Cape’ at a time when ‘the West has allowed Moscow to acquire a bridge in our 
country to launche [sic] new thrusts against South West Africa, South Africa, Zambia 
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and Zaire’.66 Thus reassured, his South African allies accepted what they understood 
as Savimbi’s preference for ‘a community oriented socialist system in which a large 
measure of free enterprise can take place’, as opposed to ‘a state oriented socialist 
system, on the white model, [which] he sees as unsuitable for Africa’.67 ‘African 
socialism’ was, however, absent from Savimbi’s conversations with Americans, to 
whom Savimbi portrayed UNITA above all as an anti-communist movement. He told 
a visiting American journalist that ‘the values and ideals that have made your country 
the greatest on earth are the same values and ideals that bind us together – the struggle 
for freedom and liberty’.68 But anti-communism was again packaged in a language of 
African authenticity: Marx, Savimbi opined during one visit to the United States, was 
‘a man of German origin, in an era dominated by French philosophy, living in Britain 
and dealing with the economic problems of Britain at that time’.69 
However chameleon-like Savimbi may have been in his appeals to foreign 
audiences, and whatever theoretical debates may have taken place among the UNITA 
elite, the ideology that UNITA presented to its adherents inside Angola was 
consistent. UNITA, like the MPLA, based its legitimacy on its ability to make state-
like claims, claims based on responsibilities of social organisation and welfare 
provision, and on prerogatives of violence in defence of a nation that was constructed 
in the image of a political movement.70 The very fact of sustaining a de facto 
diplomatic relationship with the dominant regional power was, in the eyes of the 
UNITA elite, affirmation of the movement’s state-like potential. But for most of 
UNITA’s adherents, the movement’s aspirations to statehood were most convincingly 
embodied in Jamba, the bush capital in Cuando Cubango province that existed from 
the early 1980s until the end of the 20th century. Jamba’s military significance to 
UNITA is well established, but my concern here is rather with its symbolic and 
ideological importance. According to those interviewees who spent time there, Jamba 
was ‘almost like a city’ or ‘a state within a state’. ‘Health matters were looked after 
for free … Education too.… If an individual were sick, they would go to hospital 
without paying. We were self-sufficient for food from agriculture, but there was also 
help from the party’.71 Even interviewees who by their own account had been 
kidnapped from government-held zones and taken to Jamba, and who had no prior 
affiliation to UNITA, emphasised the social organisation and service provision at 
Jamba as an indication of UNITA’s worth as an alternative government: ‘life was 
good in Jamba.… They had means – vehicles came from South Africa with enough 
food.… It looked like a bairro but it was organised like a city. There were roads of 
beaten earth. The hospitals were well organised’.72 Its hospitals, schools, 
international air links and diplomatic visits by US or South African officials were 
evoked by interviewees as a token of UNITA’s potential as a government in waiting. 
It was in this sense that UNITA’s internal ideology – a complex of normative ideas 
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linking stateness to political legitimacy, embodied in Jamba – succeeded in winning 
the approval of people who knew nothing about UNITA’s foreign allies. To them, 
South Africa was simply a benign ally in a project led by UNITA, ‘a foreign element 
with technology, for Angolans to develop’.73 
On the MPLA side, South African support for UNITA, as well as UNITA’s 
links to the US, made it possible for the MPLA, long after the departure of the 
Portuguese, to present its own political agenda as a nationalist, anti-colonial and anti-
racist one, and to assert that the Angolan conflict was not about internal divisions, but 
a struggle by the MPLA to defend the nation against foreign invasion. Some MPLA 
supporters, including government officials, still insist that there was never a civil war 
in Angola: only a foreign invasion by South Africa with the US as its patron and with 
UNITA as its proxy.74 Construction of the enemy as imperialist and racist closed the 
door on discussion of the class position and ethnic affiliations of the MPLA 
leadership, attributes that threatened to disrupt the MPLA’s claims to inclusivity. 
Savimbi’s rhetoric played on these attributes, characterising the MPLA as led by a 
mestiço and assimilado elite that was more Portuguese than African.75  
Conclusion 
The accounts presented by Angolans who remember the conflict of the 1970s and 
1980s suggest a complex relationship between the presence of foreign interests in the 
conflict, the ways in which their presence was represented in elite political discourses 
on both sides of the conflict, the ways in which the foreign presence was represented 
in popular discourse, and the ways in which the foreign presence shaped adherence to 
one or other party. The official ideologies that defined the global confrontation 
between the US and the Soviet Union were refracted through a prism of Angolan 
contingencies, identities and loyalties. Only on the MPLA side of the conflict, and 
chiefly among educated town dwellers, was there an awareness of the ideological 
orientation of the party’s allies in global politics. This was possible because, even if 
the MPLA leadership’s relationship with Cuba was driven in part by the desire for 
survival, the political language used by the MPLA inside Angola was congruent with 
the discourse of socialist internationalism offered by Castro’s Cuba. In contrast, 
UNITA had little possibility of making ideological appeals directly based on its 
foreign connections, given the movement’s association with an eclectic range of 
foreign allies over the years. The legacy of Maoism animated the UNITA elite in their 
imagination of a popular peasant revolution, but meant little to peasants themselves. 
South African support was an embarrassment that UNITA officials struggled to 
justify, while UNITA’s western links were echoed only in loosely defined ideas of 
‘freedom’. 
But on both sides, more politically significant than the rival ideological visions 
of the Cold War were the realities of external intervention in Angola, irrespective of 
ideological orientation, which enabled the efforts by the rival Angolan leaders to 
shape popular perceptions and beliefs to their own political ends. Although the Cuban 
engagement with Angolan society was of an entirely different nature from the South 
African involvement, there was a symmetry in the political consequences of the 
foreign links on both sides. Foreign military backing provided security for each side. 
But of greater political significance was the foreign assistance in creating physical 
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infrastructure and providing the services that enabled each movement to present itself 
as a state and to construct legitimacy for itself through exercising state-like 
prerogatives and responsibilities. If, as Westad observes, Soviet or US versions of 
high modernism provided the inspiration for postcolonial state building, 76 Angolan 
political elites benefited from foreign assistance in implementing modernist visions, 
but took care to assert, above all, their ownership of these processes of state-building 
in such a way as to consolidate their authority at local level.  
The presence of foreign participation in the conflict also had consequences 
beyond and sometimes contrary to the political strategies of the warring parties. 
Asked to explain the antipathy that certain Angolans expressed for the Cubans who 
had been in the country in the 1970s, a Protestant pastor interviewed in Huambo 
offered this explanation: 
 
that hatred – a person feels it towards all those who helped to continue the war. Because if it 
were not for them, there would not have been the war that we waged. The South Africans as 
much as the Cubans helped to prolong our war. So I think it’s natural that certain people have 
this feeling.77 
 
External involvement in the Angolan conflict polarised opinion and deepened 
hostility, sentiments that could be exploited politically by the Angolan parties to the 
conflict. Both UNITA and the MPLA invoked the presence of foreign forces on the 
opposite side of the war to reinforce the view of the adversary as the agent of an 
external enemy, and hence to deepen their own exclusive nationalist claims. Yet their 
ability to do so depended on them having the capacity to promote their preferred 
interpretation of events. The foreign presence in Angola could reinforce the 
legitimacy of the Angolan movements, but also undermine it. Among those who were 
not touched by the efforts at politicisation from either side, the foreign involvement 
also contributed to a sense of alienation from the conflict, a suspicion of the intentions 
of both the Angolan adversaries, and ultimately a suspicion of all things political.  
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